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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3534 
___________ 
 
JAMES JONES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KENNETH DAVIDSON, Correctional Officer, “C.O.”;  
WENDY SHAYLOR, Grievance Coordinator;  
M. WENEROWICZ, Superintendent, “Et Al” 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-14-cv-03099) 
District Judge: James Knoll Gardner 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 20, 2016 
 
Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: November 15, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 James Jones appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in his civil rights case.   We will summarily affirm. 
 In May 2014, Jones, an inmate at SCI- Graterford, filed a civil rights complaint 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations for 
retaliation and for failing to take action regarding grievances and appeals he had filed 
concerning a false misconduct report.  Jones alleges that he and Corrections Officer (CO) 
Kenneth Davidson engaged in a verbal altercation on October 22, 2011, following which 
Jones filed a grievance against CO Davidson.  Approximately one week later, CO 
Davidson charged plaintiff with misconduct for sexual contact with another inmate.  
According to Jones, CO Davidson did so in retaliation for the grievance Jones filed.  
Jones was found guilty of the charge and pursued an appeal through the prison system, 
which was ultimately unsuccessful.  Jones named as defendants CO Davidson; Wendy 
Shaylor, Graterford Grievance Coordinator; and M. Wenerowicz, Graterford 
Superintendent.        
 In July 2014, Shaylor and Wenerowicz filed a motion to dismiss Jones’ complaint. 
In October 2014, Jones filed a motion for default judgment against CO Davidson for 
failure to file a responsive pleading to Jones’ complaint.  In June 2015, CO Davidson 
filed a notice of intent to file a response nunc pro tunc, along with a motion to dismiss 
Jones’ complaint.  Jones’ motion for default judgment was subsequently denied.  By 
order entered on November 25, 2015, the District Court granted Shaylor’s and 
Wenerowicz’s motion to dismiss under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, without 
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prejudice to allow Jones to amend his complaint to specify how Shaylor and Wenerowicz 
were personally involved in the alleged violations of Jones’ constitutional rights.  The 
District Court also dismissed Jones’ Eighth Amendment and Due Process claims against 
all defendants but denied CO Davidson’s motion to dismiss as to Jones’ First 
Amendment claim.1   
   In February 2016, CO Davidson filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
which was subsequently denied in April 2016.  In June 2016, CO Davidson filed a 
motion for summary judgment.  On August 10, 2016, Jones filed a motion to file an 
amended complaint.  By order that same day, the District Court granted CO Davidson’s 
motion for summary judgment.  On August 12, 2016, the District Court dismissed Jones’ 
motion to file an amended complaint as moot, noting that summary judgment had been 
granted for CO Davidson and that it would be unfair to allow Jones to amend his 
pleadings months after discovery had closed.   
 Jones appeals.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because Jones 
has been granted in forma pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, we review this 
appeal for possible dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).   We may summarily 
affirm under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 if the appeal lacks substantial merit.   
I. 
                                              
1 Although Jones’ complaint does not explicitly bring a claim under the First Amendment, the District 
Court determined after a liberal reading of Jones’ complaint that CO Davidson’s alleged 
retaliation against Jones for filing a grievance implicating Jones’ First Amendment rights. 
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 We exercise plenary review of the District Court's order dismissing Jones’ 
complaint in part under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 
claim.  See Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 2011).  
In reviewing the dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “we accept all factual allegations as true 
[and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”  Warren Gen. 
Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, 
Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).  A court may grant a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6) “only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and 
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, [it] finds that [the] plaintiff's 
claims lack facial plausibility.”  Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
555–56 (2007)).  Pro se pleadings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less 
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”  Haines v. Kerner, 404 
U.S. 519, 520 (1972).  However, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their 
complaints to support a claim.”  Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d 
Cir. 2013).  
 We agree with the District Court’s analysis and conclude that the claims against 
Shaylor and Wenerowicz in their official capacities were properly dismissed under the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity.  The Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court by 
private parties against states, state agencies, and state officials in their official capacities, 
absent consent by the state.  Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-70 
(1997).  While a state may lose its immunity by Congressional abrogation or by waiver, 
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see Lavia v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000), Congress did not 
abrogate states’ sovereign immunity when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Will v. Mich. 
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989).  Moreover, we have previously noted that 
the Pennsylvania legislature has expressly declined to waive its sovereign immunity by 
statute.  See Lavia, 224 F.3d at 195; see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8521(b).  To the 
extent that Shaylor and Wenerowicz were sued in their official capacities, they are 
immune from suit. 
       We further agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Jones failed to plead 
sufficient facts to establish liability for Shaylor and Wenerowicz in their individual 
capacities.  Liability under § 1983 may not be based solely on the doctrine of respondeat 
superior.  See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005).  Instead, the plaintiff 
must show that the official’s conduct caused the deprivation of a federally protected right.  
See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).  More particularly, the plaintiff must 
allege that the defendant was personally involved in the deprivation.  See Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  Here, Jones failed to allege any 
personal involvement of Shaylor or Wenerowicz other than by virtue of their supervisory 
positions.   
II. 
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 Jones’ Due Process claims against all defendants stem from the disciplinary 
consequences2 of the allegedly retaliatory, fabricated misconduct charge.  Jones also 
alleges, inter alia, that Shaylor and Wenerowicz failed to sufficiently investigate his 
grievances, and he was not permitted to present witnesses at his misconduct hearing in 
violation of his Due Process rights.  A prisoner has a right to procedural due process 
when he is deprived of a legally cognizable liberty interest, which occurs when the prison 
“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life.”  Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).  However, 
“discipline in segregated confinement [does] not present the type of atypical, significant 
deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest” under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 486; see also Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (holding seven months of disciplinary confinement did not implicate liberty 
interest); Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 151–52 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding disciplinary 
detention for fifteen days and administrative segregation for 120 days did not implicate 
liberty interest); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding 
administrative detention for fifteen months did not implicate liberty interest).  
Accordingly, the procedures to which he is entitled under Wolff do not apply.  See Wolff 
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974) (holding where inmate may be deprived of 
                                              
2 Specifically, Jones claims that, as a result of the misconduct charge, he was placed in 
the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) for thirty days, designated a predator, ostracized and 
stigmatized, and assigned a higher security status, which affects his housing, work 
eligibility, and school and program consideration. 
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protected liberty interest, he is entitled to: (1) advance written notice of disciplinary 
charges; (2) the opportunity, when consistent with prison safety and penological goals, to 
call witnesses and present evidence; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the 
evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action).3  
III. 
 We further conclude that summary judgment was proper with regard to Jones’ 
retaliation claim against CO Davidson.  Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  The moving party “bears the initial 
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying 
those portions” of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of 
material fact.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  If the moving party 
meets its burden, the nonmoving party then must present specific facts that show there is 
a genuine issue for trial.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1), (e)(2); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  A court should grant summary judgment where the non-
movant’s evidence is merely colorable or not significantly probative, Anderson, 477 U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
3 Jones’ Eighth Amendment claim against CO Davidson is equally without merit and was 
appropriately dismissed by the District Court.  Where conditions are not “cruel and 
unusual” but merely “restrictive and even harsh,” they do not violate the Eighth 
Amendment but rather “are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their 
offenses against society.”  Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).  Placing an 
inmate in restricted housing does not violate the Eighth Amendment “as long as the 
conditions of confinement are not foul, inhuman or totally without penological 
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at 249-50, because “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of 
fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial,’” Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted). 
 To establish a claim of retaliation, a prisoner must show:  (1) that he was engaged 
in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) that he “suffered some ‘adverse action’ at the 
hands of the prison officials”; and (3) that the protected activity was “a substantial or 
motivating factor” in the prison officials’ decision to take the adverse action.  Rauser v. 
Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333-34 (3d Cir. 2001).  The burden then shifts to the prison officials 
to prove “that they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for 
reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”  Id. at 334. 
 Here, as the District Court aptly concluded, Jones satisfied the first two prongs of 
a prima facie First Amendment retaliation claim by: (1) filing a grievance; and (2) 
alleging that, as a result of the fabricated misconduct charge by CO Davidson, he was 
designated a predator and a homosexual; given a higher security status, which negatively 
affected his housing, work eligibility, school and program considerations; and ostracized, 
see Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2000).  With regard to the third 
and most contested factor, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Jones’ 
proclivity for sexual misconduct prior to his incarceration and history of infractions4 after 
                                                                                                                                                  
justification.” See Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992). 
4 CO Davidson provided evidence that Jones is currently incarcerated for a variety of 
criminal offenses, including rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse.  Jones’ 
prison disciplinary record also lists thirty-six charges over seventeen years, eighteen of 
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he arrived at Graterford was more than sufficient to show that his placement in the RHU 
served a legitimate penological interest and would have occurred regardless of any 
retaliatory motive.  See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334.  Jones’ retaliatory discipline claim fails 
because there is “some evidence” supporting the guilty finding for the misconduct charge 
brought against Jones after he filed his grievance against CO Davidson.  See Henderson 
v. Baird, 29 F.3d 464, 469 (8th Cir. 1994).   
 Moreover, Jones’ own account of the incident partially supports defendant’s 
version of events because he does not deny that another inmate was in his cell, that he 
disrobed, and that a curtain was restricting the view of his cell, which he explained to CO 
Davidson “may have looked suspicious, but nothing sexual occurred.”  Jones has 
provided some countervailing evidence in support of his allegations, including CO 
Davidson’s subsequent criminal history for tax fraud, which is relevant to his credibility, 
and the affidavits of fellow inmates.  However, we agree with the District Court’s 
determination that the affidavits of the other inmates support only Jones’ allegations 
regarding his verbal altercation with CO Davidson and not his innocence of the 
misconduct charge.  After considering the evidence of record, a reasonable finder of fact 
would have to conclude that CO Davidson would have made the same decision out of 
legitimate penological interests regardless of any retaliatory motive.  See Rauser, 241 
F.3d at 334.  Thus, summary judgment was appropriate as to this claim. 
                                                                                                                                                  
which he was found guilty.  In another nine instances, he was not exonerated, although 
the charges were reduced.   
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IV. 
 Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
